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Abstract: SME investment opportunities depend on the level of financing constraints 
that firms face. Earlier research has mainly focused on the controversial argument that 
cash flow-investment correlations increase with the level of these constraints. We focus 
on bank loans rather than cash flow. Our results show that investment is sensitive to 
bank  loans  for  unconstrained  firms  but  not  for  constrained  firms,  and  trade  credit 
predicts investment, but only for constrained firms. We also find that unconstrained 
firms use bank loans to finance trade credit provided to other firms. Our results illustrate 
alternative mechanisms that firms employ both as borrowers and lenders (100 words). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of firms to optimally exploit investment opportunities may crucially 
depend on the level of financial constraints that they face. SMEs may be particularly 
vulnerable because these firms are more opaque and thus susceptible to more credit 
rationing.    Inquiry  into  the  presence  of  financing  constraints  began  in  earnest  with 
Fazzari  et  al.  (1988)  and  their  investigation  of  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity.  
However, this line of inquiry has been quite controversial.  In particular, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997 and 2000) have shown that correlation between investment and cash 
flow may not be a good indicator of financial constraints. 
In this paper we move this line of inquiry in a somewhat different direction.  In 
some sense we look at the “dual” of the cash flow-investment sensitivity argument.  
Fazzari  et  al.  (1988)  argue  that  because  financially  constrained  firms  have  limited 
access  to  external  finance,  their  ability  to  exploit  wealth-improving  investment 
opportunities will be sensitive to their ability to finance these projects internally – that 
is, it will be sensitive to their cash flow.  From an econometric perspective the cash flow 
variable may be problematic because, among other things, it may be correlated with 
omitted variables (e.g., Caballero and Leahy, 1996).  To minimize these problems we 
take a more direct approach.  Specifically, we instead focus on bank loans rather than 
cash flow in a sample of SMEs for whom bank loans are likely the least costly form of 
external  finance.  Our  argument  here  is  that  just  as  the  capital  expenditures  of  less 
constrained firms are less likely to be sensitive to cash flow, they are more likely to be 
sensitive to bank loan funding. That is, unconstrained firms will utilize low cost bank 
loans to finance capital expenditures. In particular, we hypothesize that increased bank 
loan  funding  will  (not)  be  associated  with  increased  capital  expenditures  for 
unconstrained (constrained) firms.   3 
The only other economically significant source of external funding for SMEs is 
trade credit, although it is generally considered to be more costly than bank loans (e.g., 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). So, we also examine the sensitivity of investment to 
trade credit. Our investigation of trade credit will enable us to draw some inferences 
about the substitutability of trade credit and bank loans. In addition, we investigate the 
supply side of trade credit – in particular, whether unconstrained firms are more likely 
to extend trade credit (i.e., “invest in” trade credit) by using bank loans. 
We  also  extend  the  literature  on  financial  constraints  by  examining 
predictability.  That is, we go beyond just the estimated correlation (between bank loans 
and investment, between trade credit and investment, and between accounts receivable 
and bank  loans) and investigate the casual  links.   By way  of preview we find that 
investment is sensitive to bank loans for unconstrained firms – but not for constrained 
firms.  We also find that trade credit predicts investment, but only for constrained firms.  
This suggests that constrained firms, whose access to bank loans is limited, resort to 
trade financing. Finally, we find that for unconstrained firms, bank loans cause accounts 
receivable – that is, unconstrained firms use bank loans to finance trade credit (i.e., 
invest in accounts receivable). 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
relevant literature on investment and financing constraints and presents our hypotheses.  
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, the data set and the methodology.  Section 4 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
  2.1. The literature on financing constraints, external finance and investment 
Firms depend on a variety of sources of financing, both internal and external.  
The relationships among these sources and their effects on investment, however, remain 
unclear in the literature. In the case of SMEs, bank loans and trade credit are the main 
two alternatives of external funding. Since bank lending may be the cheapest source of 
external funding (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995), access to bank lending may 
condition the demand for trade credit. Dependence on trade credit, arguably the most 
expensive source of credit and the degree of financial constraints will also depend on 
the internal source of funding from cash flow.  
The effects of bank loans on investment decisions have been mostly explored in 
cross-country studies. In particular, as predicted in the finance-growth literature, bank 
lending to firms may foster investment and growth. This finance-growth nexus has been 
presented both as an endogenous growth model whereby bank loans (and even trade 
credit) stimulate firm investment (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; King and Levine, 
1993;  Galetovic,  1996,  Fisman  and  Love,  2004)  and  from  a  monetary  perspective, 
showing the response of lending by banks to changes in monetary policy and its effects 
on aggregate output or even the likely substitution of bank loans for trade credit during 
a monetary tightening (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Calomiris et al., 1995; Oliner, and 
Rudebusch, 1996; Nielsen, 2002; Fukuda et al., 2006).  
Much of the previous literature on financing constraints has focused on cash 
flow-investment  sensitivity.  This  literature  has  been  embroiled  in  considerable 
controversy with two main opposing views.  On one side, Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) 
suggest that financing constraints increase with investment-cash flow sensitivity.
1 On 
                                                
1 See Caggese (2007) for a recent discussion of the literature.   5 
the other side, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) suggest that investment-cash flow 
correlations are not necessarily monotonic in the degree of financing constraints. As an 
explanation for these controversial and conflicting results, Kaplan and Zingales (2000) 
suggest that unobserved changes in environmental conditions such as changes in firm 
investment criteria, changes in precautionary savings of firms that influence investment 
over time and changes in bank lending behavior are likely important. Hines and Thaler 
(1995) also suggests that firms may be conservative and that they only invest when they 
generate cash flow so that they prefer not to expand using external funding unless they 
are forced to so.  
An alternative strand of the literature on financing constraints has focused on the 
extent to which bank loans and trade credit are complements or substitutes.  This strand 
of the literature might be especially applicable to SMEs. Some of these studies suggest 
that external financing is costly because of potential adverse selection in the market for 
capital. They argue that trade credit may play a critical role in lower funding costs and 
in  reducing  credit  rationing.    In  particular,  it  may  be  more  efficient  for  large,  less 
informationally  opaque  vendors  with  relatively  low  cost  access  to  the  banking  and 
capital markets to obtain external financing and advance trade credit (Myers and Majluf, 
1984;  Calomiris  et  al.,,  1995;  Petersen  and  Rajan,  1997;  Demirguç-Kunt  and 
Maksimovic,  2001;  Frank  and  Maksimovic,  2005).  Cuñat  (2007)  shows  that  trade 
suppliers may have an advantage in enforcing noncollateralized debt contracts. This 
advantage allows suppliers to lend more than banks and to lend when their customers 
are  rationed  in  the  bank  loan  market.  Trade  credit  also  allows  their  customers  to 
increase their leverage. Large trade creditors have also been shown to provide trade 
credit to firms experiencing idiosyncratic shocks or monetary policy shocks (Calomiris 
et al., 1995;  Gropp  and Boissay, 2007).   Many hypotheses have been suggested  to   6 
explain why trade creditors might have an advantage over other lenders (specifically, 
banks) in providing credit to opaque firms.
2  Among these arguments is the possibility 
that vendors may act as “relationship lenders” because they have unique proprietary 
information about their customers (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Uchida et al., 2007). 
Smith (1987) and Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that in the normal course of business a 
seller obtains information about the true state of a buyer's business that is not known to 
financial intermediaries.  
As noted by  Demirguç-Kunt and  Maksimovic  (2001) the information on the 
buyer is potentially valuable and the seller acts on this information to extend credit to 
buyers on terms that they would not be able to receive from financial intermediaries. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that the information advantage that vendors may have 
over banks in funding opaque firms may imply a complementary use of trade credit and 
bank loans (Cook, 1999; Ono, 2001; García-Appendini, 2006). However, this argument 
does not necessarily contradict the view of bank loans are a cheaper substitute for trade 
credit (Meltzer, 1960; Brechling and Lipsey, 1963; Jaffee, 1971; Ramey, 1992; Marotta, 
1996; Uesugi and Yamashiro 2004; Tsuruta, 2008).  Interestingly, it is suggested that 
both views (substitutes and complements) can be reconciled when not only prices are 
considered but also whether firms are financially constrained or not (García Appendini, 
2006).  
 
2.2 Our Hypotheses 
Like this second strand of the literature on financing constraints, we focus on the 
two main sources of SME external financing:  bank loans and trade credit.  However, 
our approach also borrows from the first strand of the literature in that we also examine 
                                                
2 For recent summaries of the literature on the comparative advantage of vendors as commercial lenders 
see Burkart et al. (2007), and Uchida et al. (2007).   7 
investment sensitivity -except our focus is not on cash flow-investment sensitivity, but 
rather bank loan- and trade credit-investment sensitivity.  In some sense, this can be 
viewed as the converse of the cash flow-investment sensitivity strand of the literature.  
That literature analyzes whether financially constrained firms who are denied full access 
to external credit markets link their investment decisions to available cash flow.  We 
examine the flip side of this issue – whether these financially constrained firms can link 
their investment to either bank loans or trade credit.  If financially constrained firms are 
linking their investment decision to cash flow, then they should not be linking their 
decision to bank loans (to which they are denied full access).  If they are denied access 
to the bank loan market, they may turn to the trade credit market.  So we also examine 
whether  constrained  firms  link  their  investment  to  trade  credit  (i.e.,  trade  credit-
investment sensitivity). 
In order to derive our hypotheses, we make several key assumptions. First of all, 
as  in  most  of  the  previous  literature  we  will  assume  that  financing  constraints  are 
directly related to borrowing from banks so that a firm is considered to be financially 
constrained when the desired amount of lending is larger than the amount of lending 
that banks provide to that firm
3. Second, as noted elsewhere in the literature we assume 
that firm financing and investment are dynamic and non-contemporaneous (Clementi 
and  Hopenhayn,  2006).  This  allows  us  to  examine  the  predictability/causality 
relationships as a primary tool in analyzing the link between bank loans and investment, 
and  trade  credit  and  investment.  This  is  also  interesting  because  the  direction  of 
predictability between many of these financing and investment variables has not been 
explored yet.  
                                                
3 This is also the definition in studies classifying firms into constrained and unconstrained using survey 
data where firms are asked whether banks have denied them credit in a given period. In this context, an 
indication of financially constraint status is that a firm’s loan application is denied (Garmaise, 2008). 
Since  we  do  not  have information  on  loan applications  we  offer  a  novel  way  to  classify  firms  into 
financially constrained and financially unconstrained.    8 
We can now state our two main testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Since the desired amount of loans exceeds the supplied amount of 
loans at constrained firms, loans will not predict/cause investment at constrained firms. 
Therefore  the  expected  causality/predictability  relationship  between  bank  loans  and 
investment should only be significant in the case of unconstrained SMEs. 
 
Hypothesis  2:  Since  constrained  SMEs  are  not  provided  with  the  amount  of 
loans that they need for investment, they have to rely on (more expensive) trade credit 
to finance their investment projects. Therefore, both the relative amount of accounts 
payable and the accounts payable turnover will cause/predict investment decisions at 
constrained SMEs.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
  3.1. Empirical strategy and data 
Our empirical strategy involves three steps. First of all, cash-flow investment 
correlations are estimated as a benchmark to make our data and results comparable with 
previous research. The second empirical step in our analysis involves the identification 
of financially constrained firms. Under certain restrictive conditions, accounting ratios 
can  be  consistent  proxies  of  firm  financing  constraints.  However,  it  is  likely  that 
financial ratios are correlated among themselves and with other variables such as cash 
flow  or  sales  growth  which  are  relevant  key  and  control  variables  in  our  dataset. 
Therefore,  we  rely  on  a  direct  estimation  of  the  probability  that  a  firm  experience 
borrowing constraints from a so-called disequilibrium model. This methodology permits 
us to classify firms  as constrained  or unconstrained. The main estimations are then 
undertaken in the third step, using Granger predictability tests to test our hypotheses.   9 
The data have been gathered from the Bureau-Van-Dijk Amadeus database and 
include  annual  information  on  30,897  Spanish  SMEs  during  1994-2002.  SMEs  are 
defined as those with less than 250 employees
4. All of the selected firms were active 
during the entire sample period. This balanced panel consists of 278,073 observations.  
  In order to analyze the relationship between firm investment, bank loans and 
other internal and external sources of financing, two sets of variables are employed, one 
related  to  investment  and  financing  decisions
5  and  the  other  to  firm-level  and 
environmental  control  variables.  Table  1  contains  the  definitions  and  explanatory 
comments on the variables as well as their sample means. 
 
  3.2. Benchmark definitions: cash-flow investment correlations 
  We  begin  by  estimating  cash flow-investment  sensitivities  to  benchmark  our 
analysis against the  standard  approach in  the  literature.   We have the advantage of 
estimating  these  cash  flow-investment  correlations  using  a  relatively  homogeneous 
sample of firms, SMEs in Spain, in terms of financial structure and firm sizes. However, 
we also note that because most of our sample firms are unquoted, investment-cash flow 
sensitivities  can  be,  to  a  certain  extent,  affected  by  non-optimizing  behaviour  by 
managers (Kaplan and Zingales, 2000).  
We use the approach offered in Bond and Meghir (1994) to estimate cash-flow 
investment  correlations  in  unquoted  firms.  The  methodology  consists  of  an  Euler 
equation
6. In the general specification of the model, the current investment rate (Capital 
                                                
4 This is the standard definition of SMEs according to the European Commission’s Recommendation 
2003/361/EC. All SMEs in the sample are below 40 million of euros in total assets. 
5  We focus on bank loans and trade credit as the external sources of funds for SMEs. There are other 
external sources (such as the deferred taxes and black market loan sharks) that have not been considered 
because of marginal importance and/or lack of data. 
6 The Euler equation is a structural model, explicitly derived from a dynamic optimization problem under 
the  assumption  of  symmetric,  quadratic  costs  of  adjustment.  This  has  the  advantage  that,  under  the 
maintained structure, the model captures the influence of current expectations of future profitability on   10 
expendituret / capitalt-1) is related to lagged values of the investment rate, a quadratic-
adjustment  term  for  the  investment  rate,  cash  flow,  sales  growth  and  a  quadratic 
adjustment term for bank debt (bank loans): 
 
Capital expendituret / capitalt-1 = α*(Capital expendituret-1 / capitalt-2) 
+ β*( Capital expendituret / capitalt-1)
 2+ χ*(Cash flowt/capitalt-1)
     (1)
 
+ δ*sales growtht + +γ*bank loanst
2                   
In the Euler equation, the estimated value of the coefficient “χ” is interpreted as 
the cash-flow investment correlation.  
 
3.3. Identifying constrained vs. unconstrained firms 
  We employ a disequilibrium model (Maddala, 1983) consisting of two-reduced 
form equations: a demand equation for bank loans, and a supply equation that reflects 
the maximum amount of loans that banks are willing to lend on a collateral basis. A 
third equation is added as a transaction equation restricting the value of loans as a min 
equation of desired demand and loan supply. Similar empirical applications have been 
employed by Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) and Shikimi (2005) for Japan, Atanasova and 
Wilson (2004) for the United Kingdom and Carbó et al. (2006) for Spain. The loan 
demand  equation  (  
d
it Bank loans ),  the  loan  supply  equation  (  
s
it Bank loans ),  and  the 
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current  investment  decisions.  The  Euler-equation  model  has  the  advantage  of  controlling  for  all 
expectational influences on the investment decision.   11 
  (   ,   )
d s
it it it Bank loans Min Bank loans Bank loans =           (4) 
The amount of bank loan demand is modelled as a function of the level or the 
expansion of firm activity (Sales), other sources of funding that are substitutes for bank 
loans (Cash flow), and the interest spread on bank loans (Loan interest spread) which is 
computed as the difference between the loan interest rate and the interbank interest 
rate
7. The maximum amount of credit available to a firm is modelled as a function of the 
firm’s collateral (Tangible assets), the banks’ market power in the area where the firm 
operates (Banks’ market power) -our market power indicator is the Lerner index
8- and a 
proxy for firm default risk (Default risk) which is defined as the ratio of operating 
profits over interest paid. All level variables are expressed in terms of ratios (of total 
assets) to reduce heteroscedasticity. As a consequence, the size (scale) effect of “total 
assets” in the demand function above is estimated as part of the constant term since the 
constant term is estimated as a coefficient of the reciprocal of total assets
9. Both demand 
and supply equations contain log(GDP) to control for macroeconomic conditions across 
the regional markets where the SMEs operate
10.  
  The simultaneous equations system shown in (2), (3) and (4) is estimated as a 
switching  regression  model  using  a  full  information  maximum  likelihood  (FIML) 
routine with fixed effects. The model allows us to compute the probability that loan 
demand exceed credit supply (Gersovitz, 1980) and, therefore, to classify the sample 
                                                
7 The loan interest rate is computed as a ratio of loan expenses and bank loans outstanding.  We implicitly 
assume that the year-end loan balance is roughly equal to the weighted average balance during the year. 
8 See Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). The Lerner index is defined as the ratio “(price of total assets - 
marginal costs  of  total  assets)/price”.  The  price  of total  assets  is  directly  computed  from  bank-level 
auxiliary data as the average ratio of “bank revenue/total assets” for the banks operating in a given region 
using the distribution of branches of banks in the different regions as the weighting factor. Marginal costs 
are also estimated from the auxiliary sample.  
9 The constant term is them estimated as the parameter for “1/total assets” and, therefore, the estimated 
value of the coefficient of the estimated constant term or reciprocal of total assets is considerably large. 
10 Since some of the variables are computed from regional data, errors are clustered by region since these 
variables would be equal or very similar across firms in the same region.    12 
into constrained and unconstrained firms. Further details on this procedure are provided 
in Appendix A.   
 
3.4. Testing the hypotheses: Granger predictability tests 
We use Granger predictability tests to study the relationships between different 
sources of financing and investment and among the financing measures. One, two and 
three  lags  (l)  of  the  variables  were  employed  since  these  relationships  are  not 
necessarily contemporary but likely to present long-term effects (Rosseau and Wachtel, 
1998)
11.  
Since  our  dataset  consists  of  cross-section  and  time  series  firm-level 
observations, the causality/predictability includes fixed effects ( f ) in the regression. 
The empirical specification follows Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) for Granger predictability 
with panel data. Considering N firms (i=1,…,N) and t time periods (t=1,…,T) and firm-
specific  fixed  effects  (fi).  we  will  consider,  for  example,  that  “bank  loans/total 
liabilities” will Granger-cause investment if two conditions are met:  
i) The bank loans ratio is statistically significant in a time-series regression of the firm 
investment rate:  
it-1 t 0 it-1 -
-
( exp / )         ( exp / )







it i it t l
i it it t i it t l
Capital enditure capital Capital enditure capital
Bank oans total liabilities f u
        (5) 
ii) The investment rate variable is not significant when it is included in a time-series 
regression of the bank loans ratio:  
0 -
t-1 -
(  l /   )        (  l /   )







it it t i it it t l
i t t l t i it
Bank oans total liabilities Bank oans total liabilities
Capital enditure capital f u
                  (6) 
                                                
11 An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure is applied as a test for unit roots. First differencing the 
variables was sufficient to achieve stationarity.    13 
  If  instead,  the  situation  is  reversed  –  so  that  the  i γ ∑ in  the  first  set  of 
regressions is not significant while in the second set  i β ∑ is significant, then investment 
Granger-predicts  the  bank  loans  ratio.  Finally,  if  the  added  bank  loans  variable  in 
equation (5) and the firm investment rate variable in equation (6) were both significant, 
there will be predictability in both directions and probably a third factor will be also 
explaining both the evolution of firm investment and bank loans. As control variables, 
the Granger equations incorporate Interbank interest rates, Cash flowt/capitalt-1, Sales 
growth  and  the  Defaults  in  commercial  paper.  The  statistical  significance  of  the 
Granger test is measured using an F-test. 
The identification of the equation is easier when the individual effects and the 
lagged coefficients are stationary, so that the individual effects are eliminated.  All 
variables  are  expressed  in  first-differences  since  standard  Augmented-Dickey-Fuller 
tests suggest that first-differencing is sufficient to achieve stationarity. The estimation 
of hypothesis 1 requires running predictability tests between investment rates and bank 
loans. For hypothesis 2, the tests should relate “accounts payable/total liabilities” and 
investment  rates.  Importantly,  in  order  to  properly  analyze  these  hypotheses,  the 
Granger  predictability  equations  are  estimated  separately  for  both  constrained  and 
unconstrained firms. 
The vector of instrumental variables that is available to identify the parameters 
of the equations in first differences includes various additional lags of the dependent 
and the explanatory variables in levels. A necessary condition for identification is that 
there  are,  at  least, as  many  instrumental  variables as  right-hand  side  variables.  The 
standard Sargan test for identification is employed.  
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4. MAIN RESULTS 
4.1. Defining financially constrained firms  
The  estimations  of  the  FIML  disequilibrium  model  that  are  employed  to 
compute the probability that a given firm is financially constrained are shown in Table 
2. 
All coefficients are found to be significant at 1% level excluding Default risk, 
which is not significant. As shown in Table 3, 33.90% of the firms in the sample are 
estimated to have experienced borrowing constraints during the period. These values 
remain very stable over time.  
  Table 4 shows the mean values of the ratios of bank loans, investment and cash 
flow as well as the cash-flow investment correlations for SMEs of different sizes using 
the quartile distribution of firms by assets
12 with the first quartile corresponding to the 
smallest firms and the fourth quartile to the largest firms in the sample
13. The values are 
shown for both constrained and unconstrained firms according to the classification of 
the  disequilibrium  model.  As  for  the  bank  loans  ratio,  constrained  firms  exhibit  a 
slightly higher proportion of bank loans even if their access to bank financing is, at least 
partially,  restricted.  The  lower  ratio  of  bank  loans  for  unconstrained  firms  is 
compensated by a higher cash flow generation. The latter suggests that lower cash flow 
generation may induce constrained firms to rely more on bank lending although their 
higher demand of loans is not completely satisfied.  It is not surprising that constrained 
SMEs exhibit a significantly lower investment ratio (0.428) than unconstrained firms 
(0.507). The larger diversification of funding sources at unconstrained firms may also 
                                                
12 The assets distribution and any other quartile distribution of firms according to assets in this study are 
undertaken on a yearly basis. This means that some firms may shift from a size category to any other size 
category over the sample period but this should not affect the economic significance of “size” in our main 
hypotheses tested. 
13 Similar distributions using the number of employees as a criterion were also employed (not shown) and 
offered very similar results. These results are available upon request.   15 
explain why they show, on average, lower cash flow-investment sensitivities (0.481) 
than their restricted counterparts (0.742). These correlations are the highest for the firms 
in the first quartile although they decrease for firms in the second and third quartiles and 
paradoxically increase again in the case of firms in the fourth quartile.   
As  shown  in  Table  5,  the  sector  breakdown  reflects  a  significant  degree  of 
heterogeneity in financial ratios and estimated cash-flow investment sensitivities. While 
the percentage of constrained firms is the lowest in sectors such as “transport services” 
(21.31%) and “construction” (22.43%), other industries such as the “sale, maintenance 
and  repair  of  motor  vehicles”  (41.75%)  or  “manufactures  of  textiles  and  dressing” 
(41.73%)  show  a  higher  percentage  of  constrained  firms  within  the  sample. 
Interestingly,  some  of  the  highest  levels  of  firm  investment  are  found  in  sectors 
suffering significant borrowing constraints such as “sales, maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles”, “hotels and restaurants” or “computer and related activities”.  
   
  4.2. Granger predictability tests 
  Table 6 and 7 show the detailed results of the Ganger predictability tests for 
unconstrained  and  constrained  firms  respectively.  For  simplicity,  only  the  one-lag 
results are shown while Appendix B summarizes the results of all Granger-causality 
tests for 1 up to 3 lags.  The values from the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions 
suggest that the instruments employed are valid. Since the coefficients are shown as 
log-differences of the variables, they can be interpreted as marginal effects.  
  The results shown in equations (1) and (2) in Table 6 suggest that bank loans 
Granger-predicts investment but, investment does not Granger predict bank loans at 
unconstrained firms
14. In equation (2), where investment is the dependent variable, other 
                                                
14 In the case of some constrained firms, short term capital investments may be more important than long-
term capital investments. As a robustness check for the relative importance of short-term investment   16 
explanatory factors are also significant and exhibit the expected signs. In particular, 
interest rates and the level of defaults in commercial paper are found to be negatively 
and significantly related to investment while sales growth has a positive effect.  The last 
tests for unconstrained firms relate the payables turnover and “accounts payable to total 
assets” to investment. Results for these tests are shown in equations (3) to (6) in Table 
6. None of the relationships among these variables were found to be significant. 
  The six equations are then estimated for constrained firms in Table 7. First of all, 
equations (1) and (2) in Table 7 reveal that there is not any predictability relationship 
between investment and bank loans at constrained firms consistent with hypothesis 1. 
However, unlike unconstrained firms, the payables turnover and “accounts payable/total 
liabilities” are found to predict investment at constrained firms which, in turn, supports 
hypothesis 2. These results also imply that trade credit seems to be a substitute for bank 
lending in funding investment projects. For robustness purposes, hypothesis 2 is also 
tested on a sub-sample with no bank loans on their balance-sheets (2426 firms). This 
sub-sample includes fully-constrained firms.  In this sub-sample, the payables turnover 
and “accounts payable/total liabilities” are also found to predict investment rates. This 
additional  result  may  imply  that  the  sensitivity  of  trade  credit  to  investment  at 
unconstrained firms may be irrespective of the level of these financial constraints.     
 
  4.3. Exploring the role of unconstrained firms as lenders 
Considering the significant differences in the sensitivity of loans to investment 
between  constrained  and  unconstrained  firms,  we  also  investigated  whether 
unconstrained SMEs may be more willing to extend trade credit to other firms. Since 
                                                                                                                                          
decisions at constrained firms, we alternatively tested the sensitivity of loans and trade credit to net 
working  capital  as  an  alternative  to  our  reported  results  using  total  capital  expenses  to  compute  the 
investment variable. The results obtained using working capital are very similar and they are available 
upon request.     17 
they get at least as much lending as they desire, bank loans at unconstrained firms may 
predict not only investment but also the capacity of the unconstrained firm to extend 
trade credit (i.e. accounts receivables).  
Equations (1) to (4) in Table 8 test the relationship between the bank loans and 
the inclination of an unconstrained firm to extend trade credit at unconstrained firms. 
For robustness purposes the capacity to extend (and to demand) trade credit has been 
estimated  using  both  definitions  based  on  the  value  of  the  accounts  (receivable  or 
payable)  and  their  turnover.  While  neither  the  receivables  turnover  nor  the  ratio 
“accounts receivable/total assets” seem to predict the bank loans ratio – as shown in 
equations (1) and (3) - there appears to be predictability in the other direction –as shown 
in equations (2) and (4). In particular, the bank loans ratio has a significant impact on 
both measures of receivables turnover –as the bank loans ratio increases in one period 
firms tend to be inclined to extend more trade credit in the next period. Equations (5) to 
(8) in Table 8 replicate these Granger-predictability tests for constrained firms. The 
results show that the bank loans ratio is not found to predict receivables turnover and 




  This paper employs a new approach to investigate the mechanisms that SMEs 
employ to finance their investment projects depending on whether they are financially 
constrained or not. The paper also illustrates how easier access to bank lending may 
encourage unconstrained firms to extend trade credit to other firms. Unlike the main 
strand  of  the  previous  literature  in  this  area,  the  approach  in  this  paper  relies  on 
predictability/causality  tests  and  does  not  look  primarily  at  cash  flow-investment 
                                                
15 These results appear to be consistent with Cuñat (2007) who finds that trade creditors are willing to 
lend more than banks when customers are rationed in the bank loan market.   18 
sensitivity, but rather at bank loan- and trade credit-investment sensitivity.  This can be 
viewed as the converse of the cash flow-investment sensitivity approach.  Specifically, 
we investigate how financially constrained firms link their investment to these external 
sources of credit and how this may differ from unconstrained firms.  In this regard, we 
contribute to the broader debate on financial constraints and investment behaviour by 
offering an alternative the approach in Fazzari et al. (1988). 
These relationships are tested on a sample of 30,897 Spanish SMEs during 1994-
2002.   The results suggest that constrained firms with restricted access to the bank loan 
market may turn to the trade credit market to exploit their investment opportunities.  
Unconstrained firms, however, turn to the bank loan market.  Additionally, we analyze 
the supply side of the trade credit market by testing whether the extension of trade credit 
is sensitive to bank lending. We find a significant sensitivity of the extension of trade 
credit to bank lending at unconstrained firms which suggests that these firms may act as 
“lenders” due to their easier access to a less costly source of funding (bank loans).  
These results may help explain the (important) role of trade credit in alleviating 
borrowing constraints, in a country (Spain) where we estimate that around one third of 
the SMEs face significant financing constraints.  These results also illustrate the role of 
unconstrained firms as lenders and suggest that they may exploit informational benefits 
from customer relationships and their access to low cost bank funding.  This can be 
interpreted as complementing findings elsewhere in the literature that firms extend trade 
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VARIABLE  DEFINITION  MEAN  
MAIN INVESTMENT 
VARIABLE 
   
Capital expendituret / capitalt-1 
The ratio of total capital expenditures at end-year relative to the total amount of capital at the 
beginning of the year is our investment variable (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Fazzari et al., 2000).  0.33601 
VARIABLES RELATED TO 
FINANCING DECISIONS 
   
Bank loans  Outstanding amount of loans in the liability side of firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros)  5,531.6 
Banks loans/total liabilities  A ratio that reflects bank-leverage, the relevance of bank loans as a source of external finance.   0.20785 
Receivables turnover 
Computed by dividing the total sales of the firm in year t by the average of the “accounts receivable” 
between the end of year t and the end of year t-1. A high ratio suggests a combination of tight credit 
terms to the firm’s customers and an aggressive collections policy. A low ratio suggests that the firm is 
offering loose credit terms to its customers and/or that the firm has a weak collections policy.  These 
loose credit terms could either reflect an optimal risk/return trade-off between increased sales volume 
and increased credit risk – or, weak risk management on the part of the firm. 
6.2365 
Accounts receivable/total assets 
It indicates the relative amount of accounts receivable in the assets portfolio. It shows the actual extent 
to which the firm extends trade credit.   0.17532 
Payables turnover 
Computed by dividing the total costs of the goods sold by the firm in year t by the average of the 
“accounts payable” between the end of year t and the end of year t-1. This ratio is a short-term liquidity 
measure used to quantify the rate at which a company pays off its suppliers.  Because accounts payable 
are a source of credit to the firm, the payables turnover proxies for the maturity of this source of credit. 
8.02354 




   
Total assets  Total assets on firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros)  9,832.6 
Tangible assets  Fixed assets on firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros). This is considered as proxy of collateral.  1,466.9 
Cash flow  Net income plus depreciation plus changes in deferred taxes.  1,899.4 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1  This ratio is defined as cash flow in relative terms to the proportion of capital at the end of the previous 
year (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Fazzari et al., 2000)    0.41220 
Sales  Total sales during the year (thousand of euros)  18,621.6 
Sales growth 
Sales growth offers another alternative measure of firm financing constraints. It has been employed as 
a measure of investment opportunities and current cash-flows, which are expected to reduce borrowing 
constraints and as an indicator of financial distress for constrained firms (Fazzari et al., 2000, Lamont 
et al., 2001).   
0.4721 
Interbank interest rates 
The three-month interbank deposit rate, obtained from the Bank of Spain, and computed as the average 
monthly rate over the year.  This interest rate controls for the costs of external financing. A shock to 
interest rates may affect both bank lending and trade credit (Nielsen, 2002; Fukuda et al., 2006). 
0.07952 
Loan interest spread 
This spread is defined as the difference between loan interest rates and interbank rates. The loan 
interest rate is computed as a ratio of loan expenses and bank loans outstanding.  We implicitly assume 
that the year-end loan balance is roughly equal to the weighted average balance during the year.   
0.01320 
Default risk  This risk variable is defined as the ratio of operating profits to interest paid. A proxy for operating risk 
showing how many times interest paid are covered by operating profits.  4.25660 
Banks ’market power 
Bank market power is measured estimating the Lerner index (%). This index defined as the ratio 
“(price of total assets - marginal costs of total assets)/price”. Marginal costs are estimated from a 
translog cost function with a single output (total assets) and three inputs (deposits, labor and physical 
capital) using two stage least squares and bank fixed effects (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). 
22.3620 
Defaults on commercial paper  
This is a regional measure of the growth in defaults on commercial paper in the region where the firm 
operates. It provides a control for trade credit quality. This is the only business default rate available at 
the regional level. 
0.0236 
Log (GDP)  Logarithm of regional GDP in the region where the firm is located  5.23374   27 
 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL. 
 
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) with fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level 
 
 
Demand for bank loans 
Coefficient  Std. Error 
     
Sales/total assets(t-1)  0.6509*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1)  -2.2918*** 
(0.000)  0.08 
Loan interest spread  -1.4678*** 
(0.000)  0.04 
Log(GDP)  0.0232** 
(0.018)  0.11 
   
Supply of bank loans   
     
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1)  2.4367*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Banks’ market power  -0.9812*** 
(0.002)  0.01 
Default risk  0.000042 
(0.831)  0.01 
Log(GDP)  -0.0886** 
(0.014)  0.09 
   
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand 
equation 
340228.0*** 
(0.000)  1156.15 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply 
equation 
211297.2*** 
(0.000)  2170.12 
S.D. of demand equation  1.5322*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
S.D. of supply equation  0.4688*** 
(0.000)  0.01 
Correlation coefficient  0.6749*** 
(0.000)  0.07 
Log likelihood  158955 
Observations  278.073 
Number of firms  30.897 
 
 
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF BORROWING CONSTRAINED FIRMS 
 
 
Time  % 
Entire period (1994-2002)  33,90 
1994  34,62 
1995  31,88 
1996  34,22 
1997  32,30 
1998  34,25 
1999  34,93 
2000  35,16 
2001  34,14 








































TABLE 4.  FINANCING CONSTRAINTS, BANK LOANS, INVESTMENT AND 
CASH FLOW: BREAKDOWN BY SAMPLE ASSETS QUARTILES 




  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Differences in means: 
constrained vs. unconstrained 
(p-values) 
Bank loans/total liabilities  0.227  0.206  0.128 
Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1    0.309  0.346  0.041* 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1    0.428  0.507  0.039* 
Cash flow-investment correlation  0.742  0.481  0.002* 
FIRST QUARTILE 
  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Differences in means: 
constrained vs. unconstrained 
(p-values) 
Bank loans/total liabilities  0.212  0.151  0.006* 
Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1    0.267  0.304  0.010* 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1    0.316  0.541  0.011* 
Cash flow-investment correlation  0.911  0.844  0.041* 
SECOND QUARTILE 
  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Differences in means: 
constrained vs. unconstrained 
(p-values) 
Bank loans/total liabilities  0.227  0.202  0.013* 
Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1    0.289  0.320  0.009* 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1    0.401  0.488  0.005* 
Cash flow-investment correlation  0.568  0.483  0.007* 
THIRD QUARTILE 
  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Differences in means: 
constrained vs. unconstrained 
(p-values) 
Bank loans/total liabilities  0.249  0.221  0.021* 
Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1    0.344  0.336  0.132 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1    0.467  0.516  0.011* 
Cash flow-investment correlation  0.415  0.353  0.016* 
FOURTH QUARTILE  
  Constrained  Unconstrained 
Differences in means: 
constrained vs. unconstrained 
(p-values) 
Bank loans/total liabilities  0.202  0.200  0.225 
Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1    0.355  0.399  0.081* 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1    0.559  0.538  0.033* 
Cash flow-investment correlation  0.427  0.356  0.016* 










TABLE 5.  FINANCING CONSTRAINTS, BANK LOANS, INVESTMENT AND 


















MANUFACTURES OF FOOD PRODUCTS AND 
BEVERAGES  26,29  0.208  0.348  0.523  0.421 
MANUFACTURES OF TEXTILES AND DRESSING  41,73  0.243  0.287  0.341  0.404 
MANUFACTURES OF WOOD, PAPER, PRINTING 
AND RECORDED MEDIA PRODUCTS  39,00  0.237  0.312  0.346  0.599 
MANUFACTURES OF CHEMICAL, PLASTIC, 
MINERAL AND METAL PRODUCTS  35,29  0.232  0.302  0.382  0.577 
MANUFACTURES OF MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT AND TRASNSPORT VEHICLES  25,22  0.199  0.336  0.588  0.503 
MANUFACTURES OF FURNITURE AND 
RECYCLING  34,89  0.236  0.301  0.411  0.437 
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY  24,36  0.218  0.351  0.603  0.557 
CONSTRUCTION  22,43  0.240  0.353  0.449  0.634 
SALE, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES  41,75  0.246  0.328  0.423  0.614 
WHOLESALE TRADE AND COMISSION TRADE  39,85  0.237  0.303  0.351  0.329 
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS  48,43  0.251  0.317  0.488  0.555 
TRANSPORT SERVICES  21,31  0.197  0.303  0.538  0.329 
REAL STATE ACTIVITIES  30,46  0.207  0.298  0.403  0.346 
RENTING OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT  32,14  0.213  0.304  0.416  0.530 
COMPUTER AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  37,44  0.220  0.331  0.374  0.587 
OTHER RETAIL TRADE PRODUCTS AND 
SERVICES  30,36  0.204  0.311  0.412  0.431 
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TABLE 6.  UNCONSTRAINED FIRMS: PANEL DATA GRANGER PREDICTABILITY TESTS. 
FIRM FINANCING AND INVESTMENT (FULL EQUATIONS) (1994-2002) 
2SLS with instrumental variables.  (95% significance level) 
(p-values in parentheses) 
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level 
 
   
 












































(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1  0.6828 
(0.119)  -  -  0.03448 
(0.226)  -  0.02663 
(0.441) 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1  -  0.22148** 
(0.002)  -  -  -  - 




-  -  -  -  -  - 
Payables turnover t-1  -  -  0.12364 
(0.237)  -  -  - 
(Accounts payable/ 
total liabilities) t-1  -  -  -  -  0.11457 
(0.416)  - 
















































F-test for overall significance (p-value)  0.092  0.002  0.045  0.058  0.034  0.067 




0.149  0.187  0.123  0.202  0.152 
 
* significantly different from zero at 5% level 
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TABLE 7. CONSTRAINED FIRMS: PANEL DATA GRANGER PREDICTABILITY TESTS. 
FIRM FINANCING AND INVESTMENT (FULL EQUATIONS) (1994-2002) 
2SLS with instrumental variables.  (95% significance level) 
(p-values in parentheses) 










































             
























(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1  0.34290 
(0.193)  -  -  0.01238 
(0.267)  -  0.01091 
(0.347) 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1  -  0.12088 
(0.210)  -  -  -  - 




-  -  -  -  -  - 
Payables turnover t-1  -  -  0.53652** 
(0.003)  -  -  - 
(Accounts payable/ 
total liabilities) t-1  -  -  -  -  0.61178** 
(0.002)  - 
















































F-test for overall significance (p-value)  0.061  0.003  0.003  0.052  0.003  0.079 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.136  0.151  0.191  0.158  0.121  0.186 
 
* significantly different from zero at 5% level 






TABLE 8.  THE ROLE OF UNCONSTRAINED FIRMS AS LENDERS: PANEL DATA 
GRANGER PREDICTABILITY TESTS (FULL EQUATIONS) (1994-2002) 
2SLS with instrumental variables.  (95% significance level) 
(p-values in parentheses) 


















  UNCONSTRAINED FIRMS  CONSTRAINED FIRMS 































(0.131)         
























Bank loans/total liabilities t-1  -  0.85987** 
(0.001)  -  0.63685** 
(0.003)  -  -  -  - 
Receivables turnover t-1  0.02360 
(0.288)  -  -  -  -  0.23590 





-  -  0.02057 
(0.441)  -  0.01058 
(0.328)  -  -  - 
Payables turnover t-1  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.01025 
(0.352)  - 
(Accounts payable/ 
total liabilities) t-1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 







(0.266)  -  -  -  - 
























































Sargan test (p-value)  0.151  0.132  0.125  0.246  0.058  0.044  0.058  0.048 
 
* significantly different from zero at 5% level 
** significantly different from zero at 1% level   34 
APPENDIX  A:  COMPUTING  PROBABILITIES  FROM  THE 
DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF FIRM FINANCING CONSTRAINTS 
 
According to the results from the disequilibrium model in section 4.1., a firm is 
defined as financially constrained in year t if the probability that the desired amount of 
bank credit in year t exceeds the maximum amount of credit available in the same year 
is greater than 0.5. Following Gersovitz (1980), the probability that firm will face a 
financial constraint in year is derived as follows: 
Pr( ) Pr( )
d d s s
d s d d d s s s it it
it it it it it it
X X
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    (A1) 
where 
d
it X  and 
s
it X  denote the variables that determine firms’ loan demand and the 
maximum amount of credit available to firms, respectively. The error terms are assumed 
to be distributed normally,
2 var( )
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it it u u σ = −  , and Φ(.) is a standard normal distribution 
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF PANEL DATA GRANGER PREDICTABILITY TESTS (1-3 
LAGS). FIRM FINANCING AND INVESTMENT: UNCONSTRAINED FIRMS VS. 
CONSTRAINED FIRMS.  (1994-2002) 
2SLS with instrumental variables.  (95% significance level) 




“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1”  “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1”predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)   F test    Lags (l)  F test 
YES  1  10.13  NO  1  0.02 
YES  2  11.25  NO  2  0.09 
YES  3  7.80  NO  3  0.71 
“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Receivables turnover”  “Receivables turnover” predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    Lags (l)  F test 
YES  1  11.02  NO  1  0.11 
YES  2  4.26  NO  2  0.17 
YES  3  6.89  NO  3  0.10 
“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Account receivables/total 
assets” 
“Account receivables/total assets” predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    Lags (l)  F test 
YES  1  11.02  NO  1  0.12 
YES  2  4.26  NO  2  0.14 
NO  3  0.89  NO  3  0.16 
“Payables turnover” predicts “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1”  “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1” predicts “Payables turnover” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
NO  1  0.21  NO  1  0.09 
NO  2  0.16  NO  2  0.07 
NO  3  0.08  NO  3  0.17 
“Accounts payable/total liabilities” predicts “Capital expendituret / 
capitalt-1” 
“Capital expendituret / capitalt-1” predicts “Accounts payable/ total 
liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
NO  1  0.32  NO  1  0.06 
NO  2  0.11  NO  2  0.04 
NO  3  0.02  NO  3  0.14 
 
CONSTRAINED FIRMS 
“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1”  “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1” predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)   F test    lags (l)  F test 
NO  1  0.21  NO  1  0.03 
NO      2  0.08  NO  2  0.07 
NO  3  0.16  NO  3  0.09 
“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Receivables turnover”  “Account receivables/total assets” predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
NO  1  0.08  NO  1  0.08 
NO  2  0.09  NO  2  0.09 
NO  3  0.11  NO  3  0.12 
“Bank loans/total liabilities” predicts “Account receivables/total 
assets” 
“Account receivables/total assets” predicts “Bank loans/total liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
NO  1  0.02  NO  1  0.06 
NO  2  0.06  NO  2  0.05 
NO  3  0.09  NO  3  0.04 
“Payables turnover ” predicts “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1”  “Capital expendituret / capitalt-1” predicts “Payables turnover/ total 
liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
YES  1  9.59  NO  1  0.07 
YES  2  11.42  NO  2  0.05 
YES  3  6.27  NO  3  0.03 
“Accounts payable/total liabilities” predicts “Capital expendituret / 
capitalt-1” 
“Capital expendituret / capitalt-1” predicts “Accounts payable/ total 
liabilities” 
  Lags (l)  F test    lags (l)  F test 
YES  1  11.16  NO  1  0.03 
YES  2  8.19  NO  2  0.04 
NO  3  0.05  NO  3  0.06 
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